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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND TAX EVASION:
WHETHER FATCA NON-COMPLIANCE FINES AND
FBAR PENALTIES ARE EXCESSIVE
Tyler R. Murray*
INTRODUCTION
Globalization and technological development have contributed to one of the
most pressing issues in the United States—offshore tax evasion.1 Although it is dif-
ficult to estimate the exact amount of revenue losses from offshore tax abuses, the
United States loses approximately $100 billion per year from offshore tax evasion.2
The problem was highlighted in 2008 when the United States Department of Justice’s
Tax Division investigated Switzerland’s largest bank, UBS AG.3 In 2009, UBS AG
admitted to defrauding the United States by impeding the Internal Revenue Service’s
(IRS) collection of tax revenues from U.S. taxpayers and paid $780 million in fines,
penalties, interest, and restitution to the United States.4 More recent than the UBS AG
scandal, the Tax Division has assisted the investigation of many other prominent banks
throughout the world that have conspired to defraud the United States.5 As of the
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1 See Offshore Compliance Initiative, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/tax
/offshore_compliance_initiative [http://perma.cc/U56J-R58J] (“One of the Tax Division’s
top litigation priorities is combatting the serious problem of non-compliance with our tax
laws by U.S. taxpayers using secret offshore bank accounts.”); see also Tracy A. Kaye, Inno-
vations in the War on Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. REV. 363, 364–65 (2014).
2 JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 1 (2015); Frederic Behrens, Using a Sledgehammer to Crack
a Nut: Why FATCA Will Not Stand, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 205, 211 (2013).
3 Offshore Compliance Initiative, supra note 1.
4 Id.
5 See id. (“The Tax Division has opened investigations into numerous additional offshore
banks located in Switzerland, India, Israel and elsewhere. From 2008 through April 2013,
the Tax Division has charged over 30 banking professionals and 60 account holders, thus far
resulting in five convictions after trial and 55 guilty pleas, including 2 trial convictions and 16
guilty pleas in the first four months of 2013 alone.”); Credit Suisse Sentenced for Conspiracy
to Help U.S. Taxpayers Hide Offshore Accounts from Internal Revenue Service, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-sentenced-conspiracy-help-us
-taxpayers-hide-offshore-accounts-internal-revenue [http://perma.cc/RSL6-VT97] [hereinafter
Credit Suisse Sentenced] (explaining that on November 21, 2014, Credit Suisse AG, a Swiss
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end of August 2015, more than twenty major Swiss banks reached non-prosecution
agreements with the Department of Justice.6
Despite successful attempts at reigning in foreign banks, however, the United
States unilaterally responded to the global problem. Congress enacted the Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) in 2010,7 veiled as the funding mechanism
for the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE Act).8 FATCA enlists
foreign financial institutions to provide specific information directly to the IRS re-
garding financial accounts that are held by either U.S. taxpayers or foreign entities
in which U.S. taxpayers hold a substantial ownership interest.9 Moreover, foreign
financial institutions that fail to comply with the reporting obligations incur a with-
holding tax on a variety of withholdable payments from the United States.10 IRS
Commissioner John Koskinen recently stated that the IRS “owe[s] it to the vast
majority of honest U.S. taxpayers to tirelessly search for and prosecute those who
dodge paying their fair share and the unprincipled professionals who assist them.”11
bank, was sentenced for conspiracy to aid and assist U.S. taxpayers in filing false income tax
returns and other documents with the Internal Revenue Service, penalties for which totaled
approximately $2.6 billion).
6 Swiss Bank Program, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/tax/swiss-bank-program
[http://perma.cc/97B5-LGWH].
7 See Kaye, supra note 1, at 364 (explaining that the Swiss bank scandal brought atten-
tion to offshore tax evasion as a global problem that requires a global solution; however, the
United States chose a unilateral response by enacting FATCA in 2010).
8 MARNIN J. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ 6.01[1] (2014).
9 See I.R.C. § 1471(b) (requiring that a foreign financial institution report the following
information: “[t]he name, address, and TIN of each account holder which is a specified United
States person and, in the case of any account holder which is a United States owned foreign
entity, the name, address, and TIN of each substantial United States owner of such entity”).
A foreign financial institution must also report the account number, account balance, and
gross receipts and withdrawals. Id. § 1471(c)(1)(A)–(D) (2012).
10 Under I.R.C. § 1471(a), a withholding agent “shall deduct and withhold a tax equal to
30 percent of the amount of such payment” if the foreign financial institution receives a
withholdable payment and does not comply with the requirements of I.R.C. § 1471(b).
11 Credit Suisse Sentenced, supra note 5 (responding to the outcome of the Credit Suisse
AG scandal). It is estimated that the United States loses at least $100 billion annually in tax
revenues due to offshore tax abuses, which represents a substantial portion of the annual U.S.
tax gap. STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., REP. ON TAX HAVEN
BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 77, at 77 n.1 (Comm. Print 2008) (deriving the $100
billion estimate from a variety of tax experts). The tax gap is “the difference between what
U.S. taxpayers owe and what they pay.” Id. at 97. Additionally, the Tax Justice Network
estimates that between $21 trillion and $32 trillion of private financial wealth was held in
unreported offshore accounts at the end of 2010. Kaye, supra note 1, at 364 n.1 (citing JAMES
S. HENRY, TAX JUST. NETWORK, THE PRICE OF OFFSHORE REVISITED 36 (2012), http://www
.taxjustice.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Price_of_Offshore_Revisited_120722.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6JCV-SN6B]).
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FATCA serves as an important weapon that is necessary to combat offshore tax
evasion;12 however, it teeters on the edge of constitutionality like many other powerful
policy mechanisms.13 FATCA’s admirable purpose is undermined by its questionably
blatant disregard for the U.S. Constitution.14 An essential part of FATCA is to en-
courage voluntary compliance with U.S. tax laws,15 yet it aims to deter offshore tax
evasion via substantial penalties relative to the assets that U.S. taxpayers must
disclose on Form 8938,16 regardless of willfulness.17 Andrew Quinlan stated that
“FATCA remains both politically and legally vulnerable, and ultimately represents
a doomed effort to treat the symptoms of the tax code’s many inadequacies rather
than root causes.”18 Quinlan cited three constitutional objections to FATCA that U.S.
12 Melissa A. Dizdarevic, Comment, The FATCA Provisions of the HIRE Act: Boldly Going
Where No Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2989 (2011) (“FATCA
presents a new direction in U.S. tax law. Though its goals of increasing revenue and bringing
offshore tax evasion to a halt are arguably similar to regimes past, the method for implementing
those goals departs significantly from [previously failed] systems . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
13 A prominent policy issue that has required strong policy objectives includes President
Obama’s approach to universal health care. The Affordable Care Act has yielded many
controversial debates regarding its constitutionality. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
14 Until the Supreme Court is able to determine whether FATCA violates the U.S. Con-
stitution, the political support of the policy will diminish as it affects more taxpayers.
15 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers
2014, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Dis
closure-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers-2012-Revised [http://perma .cc
/3V7A-LKU5] [hereinafter Offshore Disclosure Program FAQs] (explaining that the purpose
of the offshore voluntary disclosure is to allow taxpayers to come forward “voluntarily and
report their previously undisclosed foreign accounts and assets”); Offshore Compliance
Initiative, supra note 1 (“The publicity surrounding the Tax Division’s enforcement efforts,
operating alongside the Internal Revenue Service’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives,
have resulted in an unprecedented number of taxpayers—over 38,000 since 2009—voluntarily
disclosing to the IRS their previously hidden foreign accounts and agreeing to pay billions of
dollars in back taxes, interest and penalties to the U.S. Treasury. As a result, these enforce-
ment efforts not only remedy past wrongdoing, but also bring into the system tax revenue
from taxpayers who become compliant going forward.”).
16 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2015 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8938, http://www.irs.gov
/pub/irs-pdf/i8938.pdf [http://perma.cc/LNL9-3QWT] [hereinafter 2015 INSTRUCTIONS].
17 The penalty for failure to disclose an asset under Form 8938 has a ceiling at $50,000;
however, U.S. individuals must also disclose essentially the same information under FBAR,
which does not have a ceiling. Compare id., with U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT OF
FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS, http://www.fincen.gov/forms/files/f9022-1_fbar
.pdf [http://perma.cc/H5XH-CBWF]. FATCA requires disclosing obligations that are in addi-
tion to FBAR requirements; thus, the U.S. individual may face a penalty for essentially the
same failure twice. See I.R.C. § 1471 (2012). This could make the penalties assessed under
FATCA unconstitutional in the aggregate because it may increase the overall penalty.
18 Andrew F. Quinlan, FATCA Remains Vulnerable Despite Implementation, FORBES
(July 17, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/07/17/fatca-remains-vulnerable
-despite-implementation/ [http://perma.cc/N9T8-6WHD] (referring to a potential legal chal-
lenge that could reopen debate on the law’s overall viability and effectiveness on three
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attorney Jim Bopp has now argued,19 one of which is that both FATCA and FBAR
violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.20 On July 14, 2015, attorneys
Jim Bopp and Justin McAdam filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.21 The
complaint, however, did not address the argument that FATCA may be unconstitu-
tional under the Eighth Amendment with regard to individuals; rather, it focused on the
penalties imposed on foreign financial institutions and passthrough entities.22 Although
FATCA is the most recent policy tool for combating tax evasion, the Report of
Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)23 also serves as a powerful tool.
Pursuant to the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970,
which is commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), all United States finan-
cial institutions must assist the U.S. government in detecting and preventing money
laundering and tax evasion.24 Under the BSA, U.S. financial institutions must retain
records of cash purchases of negotiable instruments, file reports of cash transactions
that exceed $10,000 (daily aggregate amount), and report suspicious activity that
might signify money laundering, tax evasion, or other criminal activities.25 More-
over, the BSA requires a U.S. person to report foreign financial accounts that he or she
has financial interest in, or signature authority over, if the aggregate maximum values
of such accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year.26 The U.S.
person must report such accounts by filing Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN) Form 114, otherwise known as the FBAR.27 Although Form 114 is not
filed directly with the IRS, FinCEN delegated FBAR enforcement authority to the
IRS in April 2003.28 Currently, the IRS is responsible for investigating possible civil
points—“[n]amely, that [the] Treasury’s unilateral intergovernmental agreements violate the
Senate’s treaty power, that FATCA’s excessive penalties violate the 8th Amendment, and
that its privacy invasions violate the 4th Amendment.”).
19 Alison Bennet, Attorneys Clash at Hearing on FATCA Injunctive Relief, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.bna.com/attorneys-clash-hearing-n17179935671 [http://
perma.cc/GF6B-LQJC]; see also The Bopp Law Firm’s Takedown of FATCA, BOPP L. FIRM,
http://www.bopplaw.com/fatca-takedown [http://perma.cc/5387-73Z6].
20 Quinlan, supra note 18.
21 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury,
No. 15-250, 2015 WL 4571443 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint].
22 See id. *19–21 (arguing counts four and five).
23 Dizdarevic, supra note 12, at 2977–78.
24 Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012); see also FinCEN’s Mandate From Con-
gress, FINCEN, http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/ [http://perma.cc/MA6D-5VUN]
[hereinafter FinCEN’s Mandate].
25 FinCEN’s Mandate, supra note 24; see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5318.
26 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS FBAR REFERENCE GUIDE, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs
-utl/IRS_FBAR_Reference_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/C4FA-XYSE] [hereinafter IRS GUIDE].
27 Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www
.treasury.gov/services/Pages/TD-F-90-22.1-Report-of-Foreign-Bank-and-Financial
-Accounts.aspx [http://perma.cc/LP4T-RRF4].
28 IRS GUIDE, supra note 26; see Treas. Reg. § 1010.810(g).
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violations, assessing and collecting civil penalties, and issuing administrative rulings
and guidance with regard to FBAR.29 In the complaint filed by attorneys Jim Bopp
and Justin McAdam, the penalties that the IRS enforces pursuant to FBAR are also
challenged.30 Thus, the purpose of this Note is to evaluate the penalties that both
FATCA and FBAR could impose on individuals through the lens of the Eighth
Amendment and determine whether they fall within the jurisprudential limitations
of the Excessive Fines Clause.
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution places a limit on government
power,31 precluding the imposition of excessive fines.32 At the time of its ratification,
delegates of the Massachusetts and Virginia Conventions were concerned that the
Constitution would not provide adequate protection for persons convicted of crimes33
and based the Eighth Amendment directly upon the Virginia Declaration of Rights
in order to curb the government’s prosecutorial power.34 Despite its original intention,
historical derivation is not the only indication of the extent of cases to which it
applies.35 For instance, in Trop v. Dulles,36 the plurality opinion states that “[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”37 Although the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Excessive Fines Clause in only very limited situations,38 it has provided highly
instructive insight for understanding its meaning.39
29 IRS GUIDE, supra note 26; see Treas. Reg. § 1010.810(g).
30 See Complaint, supra note 21, at *21.
31 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1989) (“The
Eighth Amendment clearly was adopted with the particular intent of placing limits on the
powers of the new Government.”).
32 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
33 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 266 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 666 (1977)).
34 See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. I, § 9 (1776). After accession, William and Mary
adopted the language of the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which “was intended to curb the
excesses of English judges under the reign of James II.” Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267
(quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664).
35 In Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court challenged the approach that the Court in
Ingraham used. 492 U.S. at 286. In Ingraham, “[t]he applicability of the Eighth Amendment
always has turned on its original meaning, as demonstrated by its historical derivation.” 430
U.S. at 670–71 n.39. Such historical emphasis, however, only concerns when the Eighth
Amendment shall apply, rather than its scope. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 264 n.4.
36 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
37 Id. at 101.
38 The Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning and application of the Excessive Fines
Clause in two prominent Eighth Amendment cases: Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), and United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
39 Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262 (“Although this Court has never considered an appli-
cation of the Excessive Fines Clause, it has interpreted the Amendment in its entirety . . . .”);
id. at 263 n.3 (“Ingraham, like most of our Eighth Amendment cases, involved the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause, and it therefore is not directly controlling in this Excessive Fines
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This Note evaluates the meaning and scope of the Eighth Amendment in order
to establish a framework best used for determining whether the Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act and the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts fall within
the scope of the Excessive Fines Clause. To effectively analyze the constitutionality
of FATCA, this Note is divided into three parts. Part I both discusses the existing
constitutional limits on excessive fines and details some of the looming puzzles
created by the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions regarding the Excessive Fines
Clause. Part II explores the evolution of FATCA, providing a detailed understanding
of both its purpose and requirements. This Part also details the FBAR requirements,
focusing primarily on its penalty structure for both willful and non-willful violations.
Part III applies the constitutional limits to FATCA and FBAR under the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, particularly highlighting the fact that courts
may enforce multiple penalties to punish the same conduct so long as the aggregate
punishment is within the scope of the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, this Note
concludes with the assessment that FATCA and FBAR have purposeful objectives,
yet each may over penalize non-compliance for certain U.S. individuals to the extent
that the Supreme Court may hold that they are in part unconstitutional.
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”40 Otherwise known in part as the Excessive Fines Clause, this Amend-
ment functions as a limitation to the Government’s power to punish through the
extraction of payments, whether in cash or in kind.41 Under FATCA, a U.S. taxpayer’s
non-compliance, willful or non-willful, yields automatic penalties, which are “fines”42
Clause case. The insights into the meaning of the Eighth Amendment reached in Ingraham
and similar cases, however, are highly instructive.”).
40 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
41 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609–10 (1993); see also Browning-Ferris, 492
U.S. at 275 (“We think it clear, from both the language of the Excessive Fines Clause and the
nature of our constitutional framework, that the Eighth Amendment places limits on the steps
a government may take against an individual . . . .”).
42 Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive
Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 164 (1995) (“The Court also set out in Halper and Austin a
viable framework for determining which civil sanctions are ‘punishment’ subject to both double
jeopardy and Eighth Amendment limits. Once again, the Court’s test starts with a presumption:
sanctions denoted as civil or administrative by the legislature are presumptively nonpunitive. This
presumption can be rebutted in two ways. A civil sanction is punitive if the defendant can
demonstrate either (1) that the statute authorizing the sanction cannot ‘fairly be said to serve’ any
remedial goal, or (2) assuming the statute does make some attempt to calibrate sanctions to a
remedial purpose, that the particular sanction in question was imposed in a form or amount
unrelated to that purpose. A remedial purpose is anything other than deterrence and retribution,
the two quintessential goals of criminal punishment.” (footnotes omitted)).
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within the scope of the Eighth Amendment.43 The purpose of this Part, however, is
to provide a thorough understanding of both the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause and touchstone cases that address its application.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed many cases regarding the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, the Court’s analysis in United States v.
Bajakajian44 provides detailed guidance.45 In Bajakajian, Respondent Hosep Bajakajian
attempted to leave the United States without reporting that he had $357,144 in cash.46
Federal law required Bajakajian to report that he was transporting currency in excess
of $10,000.47 Title 18, Section 982(a)(1) of the United States Code required that any
person convicted of willfully violating the reporting requirement shall forfeit “any
property . . . involved in such offense.”48 Bajakajian, therefore, forfeited all $357,144
to the United States for failure to report, and then the Court addressed whether the
forfeiture of the entire $357,144 violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment.49 The Court held that the forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment
because it was “grossly disproportional to the gravity” of Bajakajian’s offense.50
The Court held that any forfeiture must fulfill two conditions to satisfy the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause.51 First, any property forfeited must be an “instrumentality” of the
crime committed.52 Second, the value of the property forfeited must be proportional
to the culpability of the owner.53 An “instrumentality” of the crime may be currency,
because “without the currency, there can be no offense.”54 Additionally, for forfei-
ture to fall within the scope of the Eighth Amendment, it would need to constitute a
“fine” under the Excessive Fines Clause.55 According to the Court, “[f]orfeitures—
payments in kind—are . . . ‘fines’ if they constitute punishment for an offense.”56
Thus, the Court had little difficulty classifying the forfeiture of cash as a fine.57 The
43 A strict, textual interpretation of the Eighth Amendment requires that a penalty must
be a “fine” to fall within the colloquial umbrella of the Eighth Amendment. Cf. U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. For instance, the Eighth Amendment says no “excessive fines.” Id. In the case
of FATCA, a penalty is equivalent to a fine because it functions as one.
44 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
45 Id. at 327–28 (“This Court has had little occasion to interpret, and has never actually
applied, the Excessive Fines Clause. We have, however, explained that at the time the
Constitution was adopted, ‘the word “fine” was understood to mean a payment to a sovereign
as punishment for some offense.’” (quoting Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 265)).
46 Id. at 324–25.
47 Id. at 324.
48 Id. at 325 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)).
49 Id. at 324–25.
50 Id. at 324.
51 Id. at 326.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 327 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334, 339 (9th Cir. 1996)).
55 Id. at 327–28.
56 Id. at 328.
57 Id.
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Bajakajian Court cited another landmark case, Austin v. United States,58 in order to
further discuss whether the forfeiture was a “fine.”59 A forfeiture becomes a fine
only when it is “imposed at the culmination of a criminal proceeding and requires
conviction of an underlying felony, and it cannot be imposed upon an innocent
owner of unreported currency.”60
Although the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act does not require forfeiture
of an asset that is held in a foreign financial institution,61 the Bajakajian case pro-
vides necessary guidance to interpreting the fines (in other words, the penalties) that
FATCA does impose on non-compliant U.S. taxpayers. For instance, on appeal, the
United States argued that imposing the entire forfeiture served important remedial
purposes—it served “an overriding sovereign interest in controlling what property
leaves and enters the country.”62 By analogy, this is of remarkable similarity to the
underlying goals of FATCA—to “‘detect, deter, and discourage offshore tax evasion’
by U.S. persons through the use of financial institutions outside of the United States,
as well as to close certain information reporting loopholes that allowed U.S. persons
to avoid disclosure of offshore assets and income.”63 Essentially, the goal is to both
control the amount of currency that leaves the country and increase revenue from
unreported currency that is no longer within the country.64
Moreover, the Government claimed that the fine, or forfeiture, in Bajakajian
served as a function of deterrence.65 The United States wanted to make an example
out of Bajakajian’s willful violation of the law so that other persons would no longer
aid the illicit movement of cash without the government’s knowledge.66 As punish-
ment, the United States sought remedial action for the purpose of compensating it-
self for a loss; however, remedial action is more generally used to compensate for
lost revenues, not movement of cash that did not cause a loss in revenue.67 Any loss
of information from the unreported movement of cash would not be remedied by the
confiscation of Bajakajian’s $357,144.68 Although the loss of tax revenue from a
58 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
59 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 328 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 619 (holding that a “fine” is
generally something that looks like punishment)).
60 Id. at 328.
61 See, e.g., 2015 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 16 (explaining different penalties to FATCA
offenses, which does not include forfeiture of assets from foreign financial institutions).
62 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329.
63 MICHAELS, supra note 8, ¶ 6.01[1] (footnote omitted).
64 See id. ¶ 996.01[1].
65 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329.
66 Id.
67 See id.
68 If Bajakajian reported that he was taking the money out of the country, the United
States would not have received any portion of the money; thus, the United States does not
lose anything besides the knowledge that Bajakajian took the money out of the United States.
This means that forfeiture of the money does not remedy the United States for money lost.
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U.S. taxpayer’s failure to disclose foreign assets should be prevented, the penalties
under FATCA and FBAR do not remedy the loss of revenue—the IRS may still levy
on the taxes owed.69
Remedial action is useful for the government when punishing a U.S. person who
violates the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the Code or I.R.C.). For
instance, Section 61 of the Code provides that “gross income means all income from
whatever source derived,” unless otherwise provided.70 Although this definitional pro-
vision does not provide clear guidance for determining income,71 it at least requires
a U.S. person to report worldwide income.72 Most important, the government has the
power to penalize any person who is non-compliant with the Code, so that the gov-
ernment may recover lost revenue from that person’s failure to pay income taxes on
worldwide income.73 Thus, the statutory penalty under FATCA constitutes punish-
ment and is a “fine,” subjecting the amount of the penalty to review under the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.74 Similarly, the penalties assessed by the IRS
for failure to comply with FBAR reporting requirements fall within the scope of the
Eighth Amendment.
Under Bajakajian, “[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality,” which means that the
amount of the penalty must “bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that
it is designed to punish.”75 Until Bajakajian, there had not been a bright-line standard
This provides a difference between the loss of tax revenue which may be remedial via fines
and penalties; however, the payment of back taxes in this situation recompenses the govern-
ment, and the payment of fines or penalties serves as punishment.
69 Although the FATCA regime takes a hard stance against offshore tax evasion, and it
rightfully seeks to recover the taxes that are owed by non-compliant U.S. taxpayers, the
penalties for non-compliance are not the only tool used. The United States may recover the
owed taxes within the statute of limitations period, as it continues to process the information
that foreign financial institutions provide. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, JOINT
STATEMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND REGARDING A FRAMEWORK FOR
COOPERATION TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FATCA (2012), http://www.treasury
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/FATCA%20Joint%20Statement%20US
-Switzerland.pdf [http://perma.cc/63W3-MFPG] (showing the cooperation between the United
States and Switzerland to enforce FATCA through an intergovernmental approach).
70 I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (1986).
71 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (explaining that “gross income means all income from whatever
source derived,” which renders income essentially undefined).
72 See id. (“[A]ll income from whatever source derived . . . .” (emphasis added)).
73 See I.R.C. § 7201 (declaring monetary penalty for tax evasion).
74 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 n.6 (1998) (citing Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993)).
75 Id. at 334 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 622–23 (explaining that the government exacted
too high a penalty relative to the committed offense)); see also Alexander v. United States,
509 U.S. 544, 558 (1993) (“It is in the light of the extensive criminal activities which
petitioner apparently conducted . . . that the question whether the forfeiture was ‘excessive’
must be considered.”).
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for assessing whether a punitive fine violated the Excessive Fines Clause;76 thus, the
Court established that such a fine violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is “grossly
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.”77 This, however, creates a
level of complexity that is somewhat meaningless.78 Without a bright-line standard,
there is virtually no way to predict or define what is grossly disproportional.79
Despite knowing that the rule requires the fine to be proportional to the gravity of
the offense, the court in Moore v. United States, incorrectly applied the rule in a
FBAR penalty case.80 For instance, the court stated, “[a]dmittedly, the Government
has wholly failed to point out the harm that Mr. Moore’s failure to report caused,
and has given the court no basis to compare the severity of Mr. Moore’s offense to
similar violations,” yet it determined that the penalty was not excessive.81 The court
solely relied on the calculation that the penalty equaled about 10% of the value of
Mr. Moore’s account, which was much lower than the magnitude of the forfeiture
in Bajakajian.82 This means that the court failed to actually consider whether the fine
itself was proportional to the harm created by Mr. Moore’s offense, despite accu-
rately citing the rule from Bajakajian.
Although it may be difficult to apply in practice, the Bajakajian Court did at
least provide some guidance for interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause for the first
time with regard to a punitive forfeiture.83 The Court’s analysis for whether such for-
feiture is “excessive” yields a rather imprecise proportionality test for evaluating the
fine within the scope of the Eighth Amendment: “Excessive means surpassing the
usual, the proper, or a normal measure of proportion.”84 Although this definition
provides some guidance, it is not entirely helpful because it creates a subjective test,
rather than a clear, distinct bright-line test for determining whether a fine is excessive.
76 See generally Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 321 (creating the first bright-line standard for
assessing punitive fines in light of the Excessive Fines Clause).
77 Id. at 334.
78 Although it is clear that the fine must be proportional to the gravity of the offense, it
is not clear how to determine whether a fine is proportional. This has led to recent confusion.
See Moore v. United States, No. C13-2063-RAJ, 2015 WL 1510007, at *10 (W.D. Wash.
2015) (explaining that “no rigid inquiry governs the court’s proportionality inquiry,” but
providing that a court should consider the severity of the offense, the harm caused by the
offense, and the maximum penalty that may be assessed for such offense).
79 See King, supra note 42, at 151 n.143 (“As the Court itself has stated, ‘no penalty is
per se constitutional.’” (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983))).
80 Moore, 2015 WL 1510007, at *10 (“Even the Maximum Penalty the IRS Assessed
Does Not Violate the Eighth Amendment.”).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334–35 (explaining that the Court has not articulated a stan-
dard for determining whether a punitive forfeiture is constitutionally excessive and that the
text of the Excessive Fines Clause does not provide guidance).
84 Id. at 335.
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When confronted with the question of whether an amount is disproportional to the
gravity of an offense committed, the answer is unclear.85
In Bajakajian, the Court determined that a forfeiture of $357,144 violated the
Excessive Fines Clause because it was “grossly disproportionate to the gravity” of
Bajakajian’s offense.86 Unless another case with similar facts arises, it may be difficult
to apply the test. An important understanding of the rule, though, is that courts don’t
generally look to a person’s ability to pay as a reason that a fine may be grossly dis-
proportional: “These courts have generally not regarded a defendant’s inability to pay
a fine as a relevant consideration in the context of the Eighth Amendment.”87
There is currently an uncertainty regarding the constitutional limits on punish-
ment in cases where defendants face cumulative or successive penalties for the same
conduct.88 For instance, if there are multiple penalties for non-compliance of the
same federal tax requirements for reporting foreign financial assets, there is no guidance
on whether such penalties aggregate to an excessive amount. In past cases dealing
with excessiveness, “defendants have balked, arguing that legislators and the juries,
judges, prosecutors, and regulators who apply legislatively authorized sanctions have
overstepped the bounds of punishment permitted by the Constitution.”89 Nancy J.
King has argued that there is a solution to such uncertainty, which “recognizes that
the various guarantees of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments must be
considered together, as a forest rather than as separate free-standing trees.”90 King
explained that to reign in the prosecutorial power of the federal government and
prevent the government from extracting as many separate penalties as it wishes,91
85 King, supra note 42, at 173 n.209 (“[S]tating that examining whether the tax exceeds
rough compensation would be ‘inappropriate’ on the facts, since the tax statute serves entirely
different purposes.” (citing Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948)).
Tax statutes need not be based on any benefit accorded to the taxpayer
or on any damage or cost incurred by the Government as a result of the
taxpayer’s activities. Thus, in analyzing the instant tax statute, the
inquiry into the State’s “damages caused by [Kurth’s] wrongful con-
duct” . . . is unduly restrictive.
Id. (quoting Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)). Form 8938, how-
ever, differs from Kurth Ranch. Form 8938 establishes penalties for non-disclosure. Although
the penalties are due to a tax-related issue, they are not necessarily tax penalties for failure
to file taxes or pay taxes. They are instead punitive, rather than compensatory for failure to
disclose assets.
86 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324.
87 Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 834–35 (2013); see also United States
v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing the application of Bajakajian to a much
lower dollar amount—a forfeiture of $135,794).
88 King, supra note 42, at 104.
89 Id. at 103–04.
90 Id. at 104.
91 See id. at 105 (“The need for some sort of ‘cumulative excessiveness’ review thus
varies inversely with the degree of protection against multiple penalties for the same conduct:
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the successive penalties for the same conduct should be considered together.92 This
is an important perspective because if the federal government assessed five different
penalties for the same conduct, and each penalty was not excessive by itself, then
the penalized would have to pay each penalty. If, however, the penalties were grouped
by the action that they intended to punish and were excessive in the aggregate it would
prevent abuse by the government.
Although it is important to prevent the government from assessing multiple
penalties for the same conduct that are not aggregated, this analysis does not provide
the constitutional threshold for when such penalties in the aggregate become excessive.
One of the most difficult issues is determining when punishment is unconstitution-
ally disproportionate. For instance, how much is too much? One would assume that
Congress fairly and accurately determined the correct fines and penalties for each
action that it prohibits; however, the debates are pervasive on this issue.93
In the past, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains a limitation that requires that punish-
ment be proportionate to the wrong punished, but it is profoundly reluctant to provide
any more guidance.94 Looking to past Supreme Court decisions, it becomes even
clearer how inconsistent its approach to determining disproportionality.95 For instance,
in United States v. United Mine Workers,96 the Court reduced a $3.5 million criminal
contempt fine to $700,000 because the Court believed that the original fine was ex-
cessive relative to the defendant’s ability to pay.97 In another case, the Court concluded
that the Eighth Amendment “does not require strict proportionality between crime
and sentence,” because it “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly dispropor-
tionate’ to the crime,” making “intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses . . .
appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime com-
mitted and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.”98
Today, defendants still have little hope of success in combating “punitive overkill”
from successive fines and penalties.99 For instance, defendants who face overlapping
the less vigorous the protection against multiple penalties, the more vigorous proportionality
review must become, and vice versa.”).
92 See id. at 105.
93 Id. at 106 (“These debates, however, usually enjoy a well-accepted body of precedent
that establishes rudimentary boundaries of scope and purpose for at least one of the doctrinal
options, providing a settled pivot around which a debate can revolve. Because of the Court’s
limited or inconsistent declarations about the scope of constitutional prohibitions on exces-
sively severe or duplicative penalties, no such pivot exists.”).
94 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327–28 (1997); King, supra note 42,
at 106.
95 See King, supra note 42, at 106.
96 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
97 Id. at 304–05; see also King, supra note 42, at 108 n.11.
98 King, supra note 42, at 111 n.24 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001,
1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
99 Id. at 112–13, 113 n. 31.
2015] THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT & TAX EVASION 565
civil or criminal sanctions remain unable to predict their exposure to penalties and
whether they will be excessive, especially when a penalty is assessed regardless of
willfulness.100 More important, despite attorney Jim Bopp’s confidence in overruling
FATCA based on constitutional principles, “prosecutors and legislatures cannot
predict whether their enforcement efforts will survive constitutional challenge; and
judges’ interpretative pronouncements about these several constitutional provisions
vary widely.”101 For instance, despite Judge Thomas M. Rose’s recent ruling that the
parties to Crawford v. U.S. Department of the Treasury do not have standing to chal-
lenge parts of FATCA, Jim Bopp is prepared for “a long fight.”102 Before applying
the Supreme Court’s approach to excessive fines, it is important to further discuss
both FATCA and FBAR.
II. THE FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT AND THE REPORT OF
FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS
A. FATCA
Congress enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) as part of
the funding mechanism for the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE
Act),103 which President Obama signed into law on March 18, 2010.104 The HIRE
Act added a new chapter to Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code—Chapter 4,
which is comprised of Sections 1471 through 1474 of the Code.105 Generally, FATCA
targets non-compliance by U.S. taxpayers through foreign accounts by
requir[ing] U.S. withholding agents to withhold tax on certain
payments to foreign financial institutions (FFIs) that do not agree
to report certain information to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
regarding their United States accounts (U.S. accounts), and on
certain payments to certain nonfinancial foreign entities (NFFEs)
100 Id. at 125.
101 Id.
102 Alison Bennett, Attorney Predicts ‘Long Fight’ After Effort to Block FATCA Is Rejected,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 30, 2015) http://www.bna.com/attorney-predicts-long-n579820
58952 [http://perma.cc/NN9T-QLFL] (noting that the judge explained that the parties did not
have standing and that the harms claimed were “remote and speculative harms, most of
which are caused by third parties, illusory, or self-inflicted” (quoting Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t
of the Treasury, No. 3:15-cv-250 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2015))).
103 MICHAELS, supra note 8, ¶ 6.01.
104 Id. (explaining that the purpose of FATCA is to offset revenue loss of the HIRE Act, which
aimed to provide “businesses with tax incentives to help finance the hiring and retention of
new employees”).
105 T.D. 9610, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 2 (2013); seeI.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 2011-19 I.R.B.
765; I.R.S. Notice 2011-53, 2011-32 I.R.B. 124;  I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329.
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that do not provide information on their substantial United States
owners (substantial U.S. owners) to withholding agents.106
This essentially means that the United States has equipped itself with an important
weapon that is seemingly necessary for combating offshore tax evasion—FATCA.107
An essential part of FATCA is to encourage voluntary compliance with U.S. tax
laws,108 yet it aims to coerce non-compliant U.S. taxpayers and foreign financial insti-
tutions to voluntarily come into compliance.109 As Andrew Quinlan stated, “FATCA
remains both politically and legally vulnerable.”110 The issue with Quinlan’s state-
ment, however, is that he does not provide an in-depth explantion as to why FATCA
remains vulnerable. Although attorney Jim Bopp has provided three constitutional
objections regarding FATCA, he has not provided an explanation as to why FATCA
is problematic with regard to individuals.111 As this Note discusses, one of the cited
constitutional issues is that FATCA violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause.112 The purpose of this Part is to provide an in-depth understanding of FATCA
before evaluating it through the lens of the Eighth Amendment.
Senator Max Baucus, Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance, stated that
“[t]he purpose of FATCA is to ‘detect, deter, and discourage offshore tax evasion’
by U.S. persons through the use of financial institutions outside of the United States,
as well as to close certain information reporting loopholes that allowed U.S. persons
to avoid disclosure of offshore assets and income.”113 Additionally, FATCA is useful
for regulating the “abuses concerning the use for the benefit of U.S. persons of
property held in trust that were identified by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Investigations in its 2006 report on tax haven abuses.”114
106 T.D. 9610, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 2 (2013).
107 Behrens, supra note 2, at 211 (“Tax evasion is a concern of any government that
imposes an income tax on its citizens. Because the United States’ federal income tax is based
on a system of ‘voluntary compliance,’ it is essential that taxpayers are given an incentive
to comply with tax laws.” (footnote omitted)); Peter Nelson, Note, Conflicts of Interest:
Resolving Legal Barriers to the Implementation of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act,
32 VA. TAX REV. 387, 388 (2012) (“FATCA provides U.S. authorities with a potent tool to
penetrate the banking secrecy laws that enable tax evasion.”).
108 See Offshore Disclosure Program FAQs, supra note 15.
109 Nelson, supra note 107, at 389 (“FATCA latches onto the cross-border payments asso-
ciated with this investment activity and offers a choice to foreign financial institutions: report
information about the recipients of such payments to the Internal Revenue Service (Service), or
face significant penalties.”). Substantial penalties also exist for U.S. individuals who fail to dis-
close foreign financial assets. Under Form 8938, a penalty may outweigh the value of the asset.
110 Quinlan, supra note 18.
111 The Bopp Law Firm’s Takedown of FATCA, supra note 19.
112 Quinlan, supra note 18.
113 MICHAELS, supra note 8, ¶ 6.01 (quoting 155 CONG. REC. S10,785 (daily ed. Oct. 27,
2009) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus, Chair, S. Comm. on Finance)).
114 Id.; see also T.D. 9657, 26 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 2 (2014) (“Chapter 4 [of the Code]
generally requires U.S. withholding agents to withhold tax on certain payments to foreign
2015] THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT & TAX EVASION 567
FATCA went into effect on July 1, 2014, and its regulations will not be in full ef-
fect until 2017.115 Although it may be common practice for laws to phase into complete
effect, it is troublesome for the non-willful.116 While it is currently being implemented,
many groups are harboring strong political and legal animosity toward FATCA, de-
spite the Treasury Department’s promise to “go easy” on enforcement for the first two
years.117 The animosity is more likely due to the fact that the mechanisms that FATCA
uses to go after non-compliant U.S. persons are highly questionable. For instance:
FATCA has greatly increased global concern over the use of for-
eign offshore bank accounts to evade government taxation, yet
there is still conversation as to whether this is the correct solution
to solve the problem or if it will just cause more damage to the
United States and innocent, tax abiding Americans.118
Under the Internal Revenue Code, FATCA creates a duty upon foreign financial
institutions to either report certain information or incur a withholding tax of 30%
when withholdable payments are made from the United States to foreign financial
institutions.119 Moreover, Section 1471 of the Code provides information regarding
financial institutions deemed to meet requirements in certain cases and elections to
be withheld upon rather than withhold on payments to recalcitrant account holders
and nonparticipating FFIs.120 Such information to be reported is the account number,
TIN number, name of the U.S. taxpayer, and account balance.121 This Section of the
Code also provides the unique definitions of the specific terms that are used to de-
scribe various parts of FATCA, such as U.S. account, financial account, U.S. owned
financial institutions . . . that do not agree to report certain information to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) regarding their U.S. accounts, and on certain payments to certain
nonfinancial foreign entities . . . that do not provide information on their substantial United
States owners . . . to withholding agents.”).
115 I.R.S. Notice 2014-33, 2014-21 I.R.B. 1033.
116 FATCA serves as a strict liability act, and, despite willfulness, a taxpayer may still owe
penalties if he or she did not know about the new FATCA requirements. See id.




119 I.R.C. § 1471(a) (2012) (“In the case of any withholdable payment to a foreign finan-
cial institution which does not meet the requirements of subsection (b), the withholding agent
with respect to such payment shall deduct and withhold from such payment a tax equal to 30
percent of the amount of such payment.”).
120 See id. § 1471.
121 Id. § 1471(c).
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foreign entity, foreign financial institution, financial institution, recalcitrant account
holder, and passthrough payment.122
Most important, the Code does not limit itself to the definition of foreign financial
institutions for requiring reporting of withholdable payments and U.S. taxpayer
information.123 Section 1472 of the Code provides that withholdable payments to
“other foreign entities” also meet the demand for reporting, but it also provides in-
formation for waiver withholding, and exceptions.124
In the case of any withholdable payment to a non-financial foreign
entity, if—(1) the beneficial owner of such payment is such entity
or any other non-financial foreign entity, and (2) the require-
ments of subsection (b) are not met with respect to such beneficial
owner, then the withholding agent with respect to such payment
shall deduct and withhold from such payment a tax equal to 30
percent of the amount of such payment.125
Section 1473 of the Code defines some of the general terms used throughout
Chapter 4 of the Code.126 It defines withholdable payment, substantial U.S. owner,
specified U.S. person, withholding agent, and foreign entity.127 Section 1474 of the
Code incorporates special obligations created by FATCA.128 For instance, there is a
liability for withheld tax such that “[e]very person required to deduct and withhold any
tax under this chapter is hereby made liable for such tax and is hereby indemnified
against the claims and demands of any person for the amount of any payments made
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.”129 Another similar obligation is
created by credits and refunds such that “the determination of whether any tax de-
ducted and withheld under this chapter results in an overpayment by the beneficial
owner of the payment to which such tax is attributable shall be made as if such tax had
been deducted and withheld under subchapter A of chapter 3.”130
With regard to complex sections of the Code, there has been a misperception
that FATCA applies to only banks or insurance companies; however, FATCA broadly
defined foreign financial institution (FFI).131 According to I.R.C. § 1471(d)(4), “[t]he
122 Id. § 1471(d).
123 See id. § 1472.
124 Id.
125 Id. § 1472(a).
126 See id. § 1473.
127 See id.
128 See id. § 1474.
129 Id. § 1474(a).
130 Id. § 1474(b)(1).
131 John C. Taylor, The Full Impact of FATCA, LAW 360 (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.law
360.com/articles/426106/the-full-impact-of-fatca [http://perma.cc/A6YC-Y7BG].
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term ‘foreign financial institution’ means any financial institution which is a foreign
entity. . . . [S]uch term shall not include a financial institution which is organized under
the laws of any possession of the United States.”132 Moreover, I.R.C. § 1471(d)(5)
defines financial institution as
any entity that—(A) accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a
banking or similar business, (B) as a substantial portion of its busi-
ness, holds financial assets for the account of others, or (C) is
engaged (or holding itself out as being engaged) primarily in the
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities (as
defined in section 475(c)(2) without regard to the last sentence
thereof), partnership interests, commodities (as defined in sec-
tion 475(e)(2)), or any interest (including a futures or forward
contract or option) in such securities, partnership interests, or
commodities.133
For FATCA purposes, a foreign financial institution includes non-U.S. banks, in-
vestment funds, and investment managers.134
Under FATCA,
[t]he initial penalty for failing to report is the greater of $10,000
and one of the following: (1) 5 percent of the value of the por-
tion of a grantor trust owned by a U.S. person who fails to cause
an annual return to be filed for the trust by the trustee; (2) 35
percent of the value of the property transferred to a foreign trust
by the U.S. person who then fails to report the creation of the
trust or the transfer to it; or (3) 35 percent of the amount distrib-
uted to a distributee who fails to report distributions.135
The important thing to consider when determining the importance of the fines is that
“FATCA was enacted in 2010 by Congress to target non-compliance by U.S. tax-
payers using foreign accounts.”136 The largest penalty associated with FATCA is that
it requires greater reporting obligations than under FBAR filing obligations, but still
requires U.S. taxpayers to file under both.137 Although FATCA does not replace a
132 I.R.C. § 1471(d)(4).
133 Id. § 1471(d)(5).
134 Taylor, supra note 131.
135 MICHAELS, supra note 8, ¶ 6.15[3][c] (citations omitted).
136 Resource Center on FATCA, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource
-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx [http://perma.cc/8GAY-Z2CX].
137 Robert W. Wood, Court Upholds Record FBAR Penalties, Exceeding Offshore Account
Balance, FORBES (May 29, 2014, 1:53 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014
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taxpayer’s obligation to file the FBAR, it does increase a taxpayer’s obligations to
file additional forms disclosing the same information.138 The issue is that, in doing
so, FATCA makes it more difficult for a taxpayer to properly file all of the forms
required.139 Also, requiring multiple forms to disclose the same assets makes
compliance more difficult and more than likely increases the errors surrounding
compliance.140 Although it may be common practice for laws to phase into effect,
it is troublesome for the non-willful U.S. taxpayer who does not accurately comply
with reporting requirements associated with FATCA.141 Although FATCA went into
effect on July 1, 2014, and its regulations will not be in full effect until 2017,142 it is
a strict liability regime that provides little time for taxpayers to learn how to comply
with its very specific requirements.143 Moreover, “U.S. persons must report their
worldwide income on their taxes.”144 This is important because it justifies the need
for a penalty.
Section 61 of the Code provides that “gross income means all income from
whatever source derived,” unless otherwise provided.145 The House Ways and Means
Committee Report of 1954 states that this all-encompassing definition corresponds
to Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,146 which stated that “‘[g]ross
income’ includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or com-
pensation for personal service . . . of whatever kind and in whatever form paid . . .
or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.”147
Additionally, the House Report of 1954 states that I.R.C. § 61(a) is “based upon
the 16th Amendment and [that] the word ‘income’ is used in its constitutional






141 See Freeman, supra note 117.
142 I.R.S. Notice 2014-33, 2014-21 I.R.B. 1033.
143 See Freeman, supra note 117 (“FATCA has been implemented, but it is not strong
many groups still harboring strong political and legal animosity. FATCA is now legally in
force, but the Treasury department is promising ‘to go easy’ on enforcement for the first two
years since delays and high costs leave many areas of the world still unable to fully comply
with FATCA. FATCA has greatly increased global concern over the use of foreign offshore
bank accounts to evade government taxation, yet there is still conversation as to whether this
is the correct solution to solve the problem or if it will just cause more damage to the United
States and innocent, tax abiding Americans.”).
144 Wood, supra note 137.
145 I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1 (1986).
146 H.R. REP. NO. 1337, pt. 1, at 4223 (1954).
147 Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939)).
148 H.R. REP. NO. 1337, pt.1, at 4223.
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definition of income has led to inconsistent judicial interpretations of the word,149
but reference must be made to judicial guidance to define the outer limits for income
because Congress did not.150 In Eisner v. Macomber, the Court held that income is
“the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,”151 while the
Court in Glenshaw Glass held that the Eisner Court’s definition “was not meant to
provide a touchstone to all future gross income questions.”152 Moreover, the
Glenshaw Glass Court defined income more appropriately as taxable when there are
“instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion.”153
Although the Code does not directly define income itself,154 it does provide
guidance for answering whether a particular accession to wealth is income that Con-
gress has the power to tax.155 Congress expressly provided both inclusions and
exclusions to gross income within the Code as interpretive tools for determining
which accessions to wealth should be classified as income.156 Moreover, judicial
interpretation of income, subsequent to the Eisner era of cases, upheld the assump-
tion that Congress intended to exert fully the power to tax income.157 Pursuant to the
House Ways and Means Committee Report of 1954, the Glenshaw Glass Court af-
firmed that Section 61(a) of the Code should be interpreted as broad as Section 22(a)
of the 1939 Code.158 The phraseology that gross income includes “all income from
whatever source derived,” was viewed as all-encompassing;159 thus, the Glenshaw
Glass Court defined income as an undeniable accession to wealth that must be both
clearly realized, and under the complete dominion and control of the taxpayer,
before it can be taxable.160 The judicial interpretations along with the inclusions and
exclusions to gross income that Congress provided in the Code, when coupled to-
gether, establish the legal maxims of both what income is and when it is taxable by
149 Compare Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), with Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S.
426.
150 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
151 Eisner, 252 U.S. at 207.
152 Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
153 Id.
154 See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012).
155 For items specifically included, see I.R.C. § 61; however, the list is not limiting.
156 I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)–(15) are the specific inclusions, and I.R.C. § 61(b) provides the nec-
essary cross-references for additional inclusions and specific exclusions from gross income.
Some of the inclusions under I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)–(15) are compensation for services, including
fees, commissions, fringe benefits, gross income derived from business, gains derived from
dealings in property, interest, rents, royalties, annuities, pensions, distributive share of part-
nership gross income, and income from an interest in an estate or trust.
157 See generally Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 426.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 430.
160 Id. at 431.
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Congress.161 If a particular item is an accession to wealth that is not expressly ex-
cluded from gross income has been realized, and under which the taxpayer has com-
plete dominion and control, then Congress has the power to classify that particular
item as taxable income.162
When a person does not appropriately include within income assets held in
foreign financial institutions that qualify as income under the Code, it provides a
basic justification to assert penalties for non-compliance;163 however, should a stat-
utory penalty ever outweigh the value of the asset? In addition to this, taxpayers
must file an FBAR annually if their offshore accounts total over $10,000 at any
time.164 If a U.S. taxpayer fails to do both, the IRS wants the U.S. taxpayer to go into
the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP).165 The OVDP requires a U.S.
taxpayer to reopen the past eight tax years to pay taxes, interest, and penalties with-
out prosecution.166 However, the penalties associated with OVDP can be substantial
and excessive.167 For instance, there is a penalty of up to 27.5% of the highest bal-
ance of the asset within an offshore account.168 Thus, some people will amend their
taxes and file FBARs outside the OVDP in order to avoid the excessive penalties.169
These taxpayers are generally non-willful violators of tax compliance laws and want
to pay the taxes that they owe;170 thus, the 27.5% penalty may be too much, encour-
aging them to continue skirting the issue by filing “quiet disclosures.”171 Where the
government recovers taxes owed, including interest, it strikes the conscience that a
person should be penalized for coming forward.
The problem with “quiet disclosure” is that the IRS has said that it will seek out
taxpayers who try it, despite the fact that they are paying the taxes that were owed.172
A similar situation recently occurred. In 2009, Mr. Zwerner, a U.S. taxpayer, tried
to come forward before the IRS had the OVDP, yet the IRS went after him.173 The
IRS “went after Mr. Zwerner for $3,488,609.33 in penalties for FBAR violations,”
which was “50% of the highest balance in the account each year.”174 Ultimately,
“[t]hat meant FBAR penalties of $2,241,809 for an account worth $1,691,054, less
161 See generally id.; I.R.C. § 61.
162 See generally Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 426 (applying I.R.C. § 61).
163 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 61(a).
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than the penalties.”175 Along with the fines associated with FATCA, it is important
to discuss the structure of FBAR before applying Eighth Amendment analysis.
B. FBAR
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) was enacted in 1970 to combat money laundering
and tax evasion,176 and FBAR serves as a strong policy mechanism for furthering
such goals. Congress codified the BSA within Title 31 of the United States Code in
order to create strict reporting requirements for U.S. persons with financial interest
in, or signature authority over, foreign financial accounts.177 This means that FBAR
is not governed by the IRS, rather by the BSA. Failure to comply with the reporting
requirements, however, justifies IRS examination that could lead to “[s]evere civil
and criminal penalties for failure to comply.”178 Title 31 responsibility is delegated
to FinCEN, which is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and FinCEN
can delegate FBAR examination and enforcement to the IRS.179 Additionally, in-
depth FBAR guidance was provided in March 2011 in 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350. The
Preamble to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350 provides that the new rule
addresses the scope of the persons that are required to file re-
ports of foreign financial accounts. The rule further specifies the
types of accounts that are reportable, and provides filing relief
in the form of exemptions for certain persons with signature or
other authority over foreign financial accounts. Finally, the rule
adopts provisions intended to prevent persons subject to the rule
from avoiding their reporting requirement.180
According to the IRS FBAR Reference Guide, the FBAR must be filed, in addition
to serving as “a tool used by the United States government to identify persons who may
be using foreign financial accounts to circumvent United States law,” because “foreign
financial institutions may not be subject to the same reporting requirements as
domestic financial institutions.”181 In furtherance of these goals, each individual who
meets the following four basic elements of FBAR filing must file the FBAR: (1) a
175 Id.
176 See 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2012); see also Internal Revenue Service Webinar: Reporting of
Foreign Financial Accounts on the Electronic FBAR, IRS.GOV (June 4, 2014), http://www
.irsvideos.gov/ElectronicFBAR/ [http://perma.cc/4PFL-DYBK] [hereinafter IRS Webinar]
(explaining that FBAR is designed to track hidden money and the use of foreign financial
accounts for illicit purposes).
177 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332.
178 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
179 Treas. Order 180-01 (July 1, 2014).
180 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 76 Fed. Reg. 10234 (Feb. 24, 2011) (to be
codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010).
181 IRS GUIDE, supra note 26.
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United States person that (2) has a financial interest in, or signature authority over,
(3) foreign financial accounts must file an FBAR if (4) the aggregate value of such
accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year.182
1. A United States Person
Under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(b)(1)–(3), “United States person” means any of the
following: a citizen of the United States, a resident of the United States, or an entity
formed under the laws of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, the
Territories and insular Possessions in the United States, or the Indian Tribes.183 31
C.F.R. § 1010.350(b)(1) provides that “[a] citizen of the United States” is a U.S.
person, which means that if a United States citizen meets all of the elements of FBAR
filing, such person must file an FBAR, regardless of age, residence, or location.184
The IRS posed a question near the end of its webinar on June 4, 2014, regarding
electronic FBAR filing that supports this analysis.185 The IRS asked: “Do I need to
file an FBAR for my infant son who is a US citizen and has foreign financial accounts,
but is not required to file a tax return?”186 The correct answer was: “Yes. There are
no age limitations on FBAR filing. An FBAR should be filed on behalf of your son
if he has reportable foreign financial accounts. Remember [that] tax filing status is
not a consideration for FBAR.”187 Although the IRS stated that the guidance it pro-
vided during its webinar may not be relied upon,188 it is reasonable to assume that
such guidance is not misleading.
For FBAR purposes, it is also important to note that the definition of “United
States” found in 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701(b)-1(c)(2)(ii) does not apply. A resident of
the “United States” is “an individual who is a resident alien under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7701(b) and the regulations thereunder but using the definition of ‘United States’
provided in 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(hhh) . . . .”189 Under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(hhh),
“United States” means “[t]he States of the United States, the District of Columbia, the
Indian lands (as that term is defined in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act), and the
182 FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, BSA ELECTRONIC FILING REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORT
OF FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS (FINCEN FORM 114) (2014), http://www.fincen
.gov/forms/files/FBAR%20Line%20Item%20Filing%20Instructions.pdf [http://perma.cc/FZ9U
-LWYZ] [hereinafter FORM 114 INSTRUCTIONS].
183 United States Territories and Possessions include the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, United States Virgin Islands, and Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands. See IRS GUIDE,
supra note 26.
184 Id. (explaining that a U.S. citizen must file an FBAR if he or she meets all of the





189 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(b)(2) (2014).
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Territories and Insular Possessions of the United States.”190 Section 2703(4)(A)–(B)
of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act defines “Indian lands” as
all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and any lands
title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the
benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian
tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States
against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises gov-
ernmental power.191
Moreover, a U.S. person must be a resident alien of the United States.192 Section
7701(b)(1)(A)–(B) of the Code provides the test for whether an individual is a
resident alien. An individual shall be treated as a resident of the United States with
respect to any calendar year if, and only if, such individual is lawfully admitted for
permanent residence of the United States at any time during such calendar year
(described as the “Green Card” test in the IRS’s Webinar on June 4, 2014), such
individual meets the substantial presence test, or such individual makes the election
to be a resident alien.193 Any individual who is neither a citizen of the United States
nor a resident of the United States within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)
is defined as a nonresident alien.194
Under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(b)(3), “[a]n entity, including but not limited to, a
corporation, partnership, trust, or limited liability company created, organized, or
formed under the laws of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, the
Territories and insular Possessions in the United States, or the Indian Tribes” is a
U.S. person.195 Even though an entity may be disregarded for tax purposes, it is still
treated as a U.S. person and it must file its own FBAR if it meets the remaining
filing requirements—whether the entity files a U.S. tax return does not determine
the entity’s FBAR filing requirements.196
2. Financial Interest In or Signature Authority Over
A U.S. person has a financial interest in a financial account if such person is the
record owner or holds title directly, another person or entity holds title for the
benefit of such U.S. person, or the U.S. person is the record owner or holds title
190 Id. § 1010.100(hhh).
191 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)–(B) (2012).
192 I.R.C. § 7701(b)(A) (2012).
193 Id.; IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
194 I.R.C. § 7701(b)(B).
195 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(b)(3).
196 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
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indirectly.197 Generally, if a U.S. person is the owner of record or is named on the
financial account, regardless of if the account is held for such person’s benefit, such
person has a financial interest in the account. Under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(e)(1), “[a]
United States person has a financial interest in each bank, securities or other finan-
cial account in a foreign country for which he is the owner of record or has legal title
whether the account is maintained for his own benefit or for the benefit of others.”198
Even if multiple U.S. persons are on the account, each U.S. person may have to file
an FBAR if they satisfy the additional FBAR requirements.199 The IRS provided the
following example in its FBAR webinar on June 4, 2014:
Is the FBAR required by a U.S. resident with power of attorney
over his parents’ reportable financial accounts in Canada, even
when that authority has never been exercised? Yes. The person
holding power of attorney is a U.S. person who is required to file
FBARs on the reportable accounts, as long as the authorization
remains in force. Whether that authority has ever been exercised
is not relevant to the FBAR filing requirement.200
Additionally, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(e)(2) provides information regarding other
financial interests that a U.S. person may have over a financial account. A U.S. per-
son has a financial interest in each bank, securities, or other foreign financial account
for which the owner of record, or holder of legal title is
(i) A person acting as an agent, nominee, attorney or in some
other capacity on behalf of the United States person with respect
to the account;
(ii) A corporation in which the United States person owns di-
rectly or indirectly more than 50 percent of the voting power or
the total value of the shares, a partnership in which the United
States person owns directly or indirectly more than 50 percent
of the interest in profits or capital, or any other entity (other than
an entity in paragraphs (e)(2)(iii) through (iv) of this section) in
which the United States person owns directly or indirectly more
than 50 percent of the voting power, total value of the equity
interest or assets, or interest in profits;
197 Id.
198 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(e)(1).
199 Id.
200 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
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(iii) A trust, if the United States person is the trust grantor and
has an ownership interest in the trust for United States Federal
tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. 671–679 and the regulations there-
under to determine if a grantor has an ownership interest in the
trust for the year; or
(iv) A trust in which the United States person either has a pres-
ent beneficial interest in more than 50 percent of the assets or
from which such person receives more than 50 percent of the
current income.201
If a U.S. person is the record owner or holds title indirectly, including for grantor
trusts, the U.S. person must file an FBAR if the U.S. person owns greater than 50%
of the entity that holds title, even if it is a tiered entity.202 For instance, if a U.S.
person is a 60% shareholder of a corporation that holds foreign financial accounts,
that U.S. person is deemed to have an indirect financial interest in such accounts for
FBAR purposes. Moreover, if a U.S. person causes an entity to be created for the
purpose of evading 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(e), such person will be said to have a fi-
nancial interest in “any bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country
for which the entity is the owner of record or holder of legal title.”203
If, however, a U.S. person has a financial interest in twenty-five (25) or more
foreign financial accounts, such person does not need to complete the entire FBAR.204
Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(g)(1), a U.S. person with “a financial interest in 25
or more foreign financial accounts need only provide the number of financial accounts
and certain other basic information on the report, but will be required to provide de-
tailed information concerning each account when so requested by the Secretary or
his delegate.”205 Although the U.S. person does not need to provide in-depth details
about each account, it is highly recommended that attorneys encourage their clients
not only to provide the number of accounts to FinCEN, but also to use the Adobe PDF
option, rather than the online form, to complete the entire FBAR for personal refer-
ence.206 If the client allows the attorney to file as a third party filer, the same advice
201 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(e)(2)(i)–(iv).
202 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
203 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(e)(3). According to the Preamble to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350 (2011),
this is a rule adopted for the purpose of preventing persons subject to the reporting require-
ment from avoiding such requirement.
204 Id. § 1010.350(g)(1).
205 Id.
206 See FinCEN Provides Additional E-Filing Method for FBAR Individual Filers, FINCEN
(May 8, 2015), http://fincen.gov/whatsnew/pdf/20150511.pdf [http://perma.cc/UHQ9-QH5X]
(“The BSA E-Filing System now provides an alternative E-Filing method for Individuals
filing the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR). Filers can now choose
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applies. This will ensure that if the IRS chooses to further examine the client’s FBAR,
the attorney already has all of the necessary information compiled into one document.
The IRS stated that signature authority over an account means “the authority of an
individual, alone or in conjunction with another individual, to control the disposition
of assets held in a foreign financial account by direct communication, whether in writ-
ing or otherwise, to the bank or other financial institution that maintains the financial
account.”207 This definition makes clear that if a person’s signature can cause any dispo-
sition of assets, such person shall be considered as having signature authority. An in-
dividual, alone or in conjunction with another, may control the disposition of account
assets by direct communication—oral or written; however, this is “[n]ot applicable
to business entities, just people.”208 An individual, whether an officer or employee, has
signature authority over the business entity’s financial account(s).209
There are, however, a few exceptions. If an officer or employee needs supervi-
sory approval within the business entity, such individual does not have signature author-
ity and is not responsible for filing a FBAR.210 For instance, is an individual required
to file an FBAR if such individual has the power to direct how an account is invested,
but cannot make dispositions from the account? The IRS says: “No. The FBAR is not
required because the person who cannot make dispositions from an account is not
considered to have signature authority over the account.”211 Additionally, the IRS stated
that an officer or employee has no financial interest in the accounts if such individual
works at the following212: a bank examined by U.S. federal regulators, a Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) or Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
registered institution, an Authorized Service Provider213 that is registered under the
SEC, a U.S. listed domestic or foreign entity, a U.S. subsidiary of a U.S. listed entity
that does not have a financial interest in the accounts of the U.S. parent,214 or an
between the current method of filing using an Adobe PDF or use the new online form that
only requires an Internet browser to file.”).
207 IRS Webinar, supra note 176; see 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(f)(1) (“Signature or other au-
thority means the authority of an individual (alone or in conjunction with another) to control
the disposition of money, funds or other assets held in a financial account by direct com-
munication (whether in writing or otherwise) to the person with whom the financial account
is maintained.”).




212 Id.; see 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(f)(2)(i)–(v).
213 For FBAR purposes, “Authorized Service Provider” means “an entity that is registered
with and examined by the Securities and Exchange Commission and that provides services
to an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.” 31 C.F.R.
§ 1010.350(f)(2)(iii).
214 Id. § 1010.350(f)(2)(iv) (“An officer or employee of a United States subsidiary of a
United States entity with a class of equity securities listed on a United States national
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entity registered under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act.215 This list
should not be read as exhaustive, though; refer to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(f)(2)(i)–(v)
for the full list of exceptions. Under FBAR, consolidated filing allows multiple tiered
entities to file on one consolidated form so long as the interests of each tier are identi-
fied.216 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(g)(3) provides that “[a]n entity that is a United States
person and which owns directly or indirectly more than a 50 percent interest in one or
more other entities required to report under this section will be permitted to file a
consolidated report on behalf of itself and such other entities.”
As with the “financial interest in” requirements, if a U.S. person has signature
or other authority over twenty-five (25) or more foreign financial accounts, such
person does not need to complete the entire FBAR.217 Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. §
1010.350(g)(2), a U.S. person with “signature or other authority over 25 or more
foreign financial accounts need only provide the number of financial accounts and
certain other basic information on the report, but will be required to provide detailed
information concerning each account when so requested by the Secretary or his
delegate.” Although the U.S. person need only provide minimal details, it is highly
recommended that the attorney encourage the client to complete all of the normal
FBAR requirements to retain for their information. If the client allows the attorney to
file as a third party filer, the same advice applies.
3. Foreign Financial Account(s)
As mentioned above, FBAR reporting requirements applies to only “foreign fi-
nancial accounts.” For instance, if a U.S. person has financial interest in or signature
authority over a domestic financial account, such account is not factored into FBAR
analysis. This Section identifies the three-factored test for determining whether an
account is a foreign financial account: it must be “foreign,” “financial,” and an
“account” as defined for FBAR purposes.
For FBAR purposes, “foreign” means outside of the United States, and the def-
inition of “United States” found in 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701(b)-1(c)(2)(ii) does not
apply.218 Under 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(hhh), “United States” means “[t]he States of
securities exchange need not file a report concerning signature or other authority over a foreign
financial account of the subsidiary if he has no financial interest in the account and the United
States subsidiary is included in a consolidated report of the parent filed under this section.”).
215 Id. (“An officer or employee of an entity that has a class of equity securities registered
under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchanged Act need not report that he has signature or
other authority over the foreign financial accounts of such entity or if he has no financial
interest in the accounts.”).
216 See IRS GUIDE, supra note 26 (noting that entities covered by a consolidated report need
to identify the account owners).
217 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(g)(2).
218 Id. § 1010.350(d) (“A foreign country includes all geographical areas located outside
of the United States as defined in 31 C.F.R. 1010.100(hhh).”).
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the United States, the District of Columbia, the Indian lands (as that term is defined
in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act), and the Territories and Insular Possessions of
the United States.” The physical location of the account(s) governs, rather than the
nationality of the financial institution.219 For instance, if a U.S. person has an account
with a foreign bank that has a branch within the United States and that person’s ac-
count is held by the U.S. branch, the account is not a foreign account. Because a person
holds a Deutsche account does not mean that it is per se foreign. If the Deutsche
account is in New York City, it is not a foreign account. Additionally, if a U.S. person
holds an account with a U.S. bank and that account is held in a foreign country, that
account is a foreign account. For instance, if the U.S. person’s account is with Citi,
but the account is held in Hong Kong, the account is foreign.
The term “financial” is rather straightforward and includes accounts with fi-
nancial institutions.220 Both monetary and non-monetary assets may be defined as
“financial,” which means that an asset may be cash or non-cash.221 Real and personal
property, however, are not generally included within the definition of “financial.”222
Interests in personal property, real estate, like jewels, collectibles, or precious metals
like gold or silver do not fall within the scope of “financial” for FBAR purposes.223 The
IRS has stated that the following may be considered financial accounts: (a) Bank,
brokerage, and investment accounts; (b) Insurance and annuity policies that have cash
values; (c) Mutual funds; and (d) Accounts with brokers or dealers with commodity op-
tions or futures contracts.224 This list, however, is not exhaustive, and further analysis
must be done to determine if the account is reportable under FBAR requirements.225
An “account” is
an established relationship with a financial institution, or a per-
son acting as a financial institution, that constitutes an account
relationship. For this reason, the value of stocks held in a broker-
age account is reportable, but shares held directly by a U.S. person
are not reportable, because the directly held shares are not main-
tained in an account with a financial institution.226
Although an account relationship may exist, not all foreign financial accounts are
reportable under FBAR.227 Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(c), the various types






225 See, e.g., FORM 114 INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 182; see also IRS GUIDE, supra note 26
(providing examples of situations where a U.S. person has a financial interest in an account).
226 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
227 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(c)(1)–(4) (2014).
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of reportable accounts are bank accounts, securities accounts, and certain other
financial accounts. For FBAR purposes, a “bank account” means “a savings deposit,
demand deposit, checking, or any other account maintained with a person engaged
in the business of banking.”228 With regard to Certificate of Deposit (CD) bank
accounts, see the question and answer provided by the IRS below:
How is a Certificate of Deposit (CD) account reported when it ac-
quires a new account number upon each renewal? The issuance
of a new certificate with a new account number upon each renewal,
by itself, is not treated as a transfer of funds to a new financial ac-
count for FBAR reporting purposes. The funds are considered to
be deposited in only one financial account, a CD with the bank.229
Moreover, a “securities account” means “an account with a person engaged in
the business of buying, selling, holding or trading stock or other securities.”230 The
term “other financial account” is rather encompassing of extraneous financial ac-
counts that fall outside of the scope of bank and securities accounts; however, the
government reserves the right to determine whether other investment funds not listed
are includable on an FBAR.231
“Other financial account” means (i) An account with a person
that is in the business of accepting deposits as a financial agency;
(ii) An account that is an insurance or annuity policy with a cash
value; (iii) An account with a person that acts as a broker or dealer
for futures or options transactions in any commodity on or subject
to the rules of a commodity exchange or association; or (iv) an
account with—(A) A mutual fund or similar pooled fund which
issues shares available to the general public that have a regular net
asset value determination and regular redemptions; or (B) Other
investment fund.232
It is important to understand the definition of mutual fund, because a foreign finan-
cial institution may title an account a “mutual fund,” but the account’s function does
not actually meet the definition of “mutual fund” for FBAR purposes. A “mutual
fund” as defined is a fund that “issues shares available to the general public that has
228 Id. § 1010.350(c)(1).
229 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
230 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(c)(2).
231 FinCEN reserved treatment of foreign hedge funds and private equity funds, which
means that, in the instant cases, such funds are not reportable. See id. § 1010.350(c)(3)(iv)(B)
(“Reserved”).
232 Id. § 1010.350(c)(3)(i)–(iv).
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a regular net asset value determination and regular redemptions.”233 To answer a
common question regarding accounts similar to U.S. IRAs, the IRS provided the
following question and answer during its webinar on June 4, 2014:
Are Canadian RRSP and TFSA accounts reportable on the
FBAR? Are accounts administered by Mexico’s AFORE? Yes.
Even though they are similar to the U.S. IRA and Roth IRA, the
exemption provided in the new regulations for IRAs is for U.S.
accounts. It does not extend to similar foreign accounts. In general,
foreign defined contribution retirement accounts are reportable
on the FBAR.234
Although the Canadian RRSP and TFSA accounts and the Mexican AFORE are
reportable on an FBAR, there are a few exceptions to the reporting requirements of
other accounts.235 Exceptions to reportable accounts include: U.S. military banking
facilities, accounts of U.S. governmental entities, international financial institutions,
correspondent or “nostro” accounts maintained for clearing purposes by banks, and
assets held in either a U.S. IRA (if owner or beneficiary) or a tax-qualified retire-
ment plan (if participant or beneficiary).236
Additionally, custodial accounts, or “omnibus” accounts, are “foreign accounts held
by U.S. banks or other financial institutions to hold investments of multiple people.”237
Although this type of account is not listed within 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(c)(4), the
IRS stated that persons with investments in these accounts would not be expected
to report these on an FBAR, provided that person cannot directly access such foreign
account.238 This follows the general rule that if a U.S. person can only access an account
through a U.S. entity and cannot directly access the foreign account, no FBAR re-
porting is required.
4. Aggregate Value Greater than $10,000
After identifying that either someone or an entity is a U.S. person who has either
financial interest in or signature authority over a foreign financial account(s), such
233 Id. § 1010.350(c)(3)(iv).
234 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
235 Id.
236 Id.; see also 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350(g)(4) (“Participants and beneficiaries in certain
retirement plans. Participants and beneficiaries in retirement plans under sections 401(a),
403(a) or 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code as well as owners and beneficiaries of indi-
vidual retirement accounts under section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code or Roth IRAs
under section 408A of the Internal Revenue Code are not required to file an FBAR with
respect to a foreign financial account held by or on behalf of the retirement plan or IRA.”).
See id. § 1010.350(c)(4) for more detail.
237 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
238 Id.
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person or entity is only required to file an FBAR if the value of the account is greater
than $10,000 or if the aggregate value of the accounts is greater than $10,000.239 If
a U.S. person has only one foreign financial account, and that account had a value
greater than $10,000 at any point during the reportable year, such person must file
an FBAR. The analysis becomes a little more complex if the U.S. person has multiple
foreign financial accounts. In order to determine the aggregate value of all accounts,
each account must be valued separately at its highest value during the reportable year,
in the currency in which the accounts are denominated. For reporting purposes, peri-
odic account statements may be relied upon so long as they provide a reasonable ap-
proximation of the greatest value during the reportable calendar year. If the person has
reason to believe that the periodic statements don’t provide a reasonable approximation,
then such person must use another method that does provide a reasonable approxi-
mation. The value in local currency is converted to U.S. dollars at the conversion rate
on December 31st of the reportable year based upon the United States Treasury’s
Bureau of the Fiscal Service. When calculating the aggregate value, it is important
to trace the flow of money and to ensure that double counting does not occur.
As with most requirements, there must be an enforcement mechanism in order
to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations set forth by the government. The
United States Department of the Treasury delegated “authority for enforcement and
compliance, including coordination and direction of procedures and activities of all
other agencies exercising delegated authority under this chapter, is delegated to the
Director, FinCEN.”240 The authority to enforce the provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5314
and 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.350 and 1010.420, however, was redelegated to the IRS.241
31 C.F.R. § 1010.810(g) provides:
The authority to enforce the provisions of 31 U.S.C. 5314 and
§§ 1010.350 and 1010.420 of this chapter has been redelegated
from FinCEN to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by means
of a Memorandum of Agreement between FinCEN and IRS.
Such authority includes, with respect to 31 U.S.C. 5314 and
1010.350 and 1010.420 of this chapter, the authority to: assess
and collect civil penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 31 CFR
1010.820; investigate possible civil violations of these provisions
(in addition to the authority already provided at paragraph (c)(2)
of this section); employ the summons power of subpart I of this
part 1010; issue administrative rulings under subpart G of this
239 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c) (“Reports required to be filed by § 1010.350 shall be filed with
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on or before June 30 of each calendar year with respect
to foreign financial accounts exceeding $10,000 maintained during the previous calendar year.”).
240 Id. § 1010.810(a).
241 Id. § 1010.810(g).
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part 1010; and take any other action reasonably necessary for the
enforcement of these and related provisions, including pursuit of
injunctions.242
Given its authority to assess and collect penalties, the IRS cautions U.S. persons
that there are “[s]evere civil and criminal penalties for failure to comply” with FBAR
requirements.243 This means that each individual who may be required to file an
FBAR should closely examine the reporting requirements, particularly because there
are penalties for both willful and non-willful violations. Although the IRS recently
stated that it will address reporting violations fairly,244 the IRS failed to provide an
in-depth explanation that improved upon the already inconsistent principles found
within the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) for assigning penalties for willful and
non-willful violations.
Under the BSA, the IRS may impose a civil monetary penalty on any person
who violates, or causes any violation of, any provision of 31 U.S.C. § 5314.245 Sec-
tion 5321 of Title 31 of the United States Code details the amount of the penalties
that may be assessed. Under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B), the amount of any civil
penalty imposed shall not exceed $10,000, unless the U.S. person willfully violated
the provisions. Although the civil non-willful penalty may be applied for each year
that a U.S. person violated the FBAR reporting requirements, the IRS provided
guidance suggesting that certain facts and circumstances may indicate that asserting
such penalties for each year is not warranted.246 Under this same section, a “reason-
able cause” exception exists. This means that no penalty shall be imposed with respect
to any violation if such violation was due to reasonable cause, and the amount of the
transaction, or the balance in the account at the time of the transaction, was properly
reported.247 In Moore v. United States, the court held that “reasonable cause” requires
a U.S. person to exercise “ordinary business care and prudence” as under United States
v. Boyle. The court specifically stated:
There is no reason to think that Congress intended the meaning
of “reasonable cause” in the Bank Secrecy Act to differ from the
242 Id.
243 IRS Webinar, supra note 176.
244 Memorandum for All LB&I, SB/SE, and TE/GE Employees: Interim Guidance for Re-
port of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) Penalties, SBSE04-0515-0025 (May 13,
2015) [hereinafter IRS Memorandum].
245 See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A) (2012); id.§ 5321(a)(5)(D)(ii) (“The amount determined
for purposes of this subparagraph is . . . in the case of a violation involving a failure to report
the existence of an account or any identifying information required to be provided with respect
to an account, the balance in the account at the time of the violation.”).
246 IRS Memorandum, supra note 244.
247 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B)(ii). Please note that these penalties apply to the violation
of 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(A).
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meaning ascribed to it in tax statutes. As with the tax statutes,
Congress entrusted enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act to the
Treasury Department. If it intended Treasury to interpret “rea-
sonable cause” differently in the newer statute, it left no clues to
which any party has pointed. The court thus takes guidance from
tax statutes and authority interpreting them, and concludes that
a person has “reasonable cause” for an FBAR violation when he
committed that violation despite an exercise of ordinary business
care and prudence.248
If a person willfully violates FBAR filing requirements, however, such person
will face a much more severe penalty.249 The IRS may impose a penalty in the case of
any person willfully violating, or willfully causing any violation of, any provision
of 31 U.S.C. § 5314.250 The maximum penalty is the greater of $100,000, or 50% of
the amount determined based on the balance in the account at the time of the
violation.251 This willfulness penalty is now capped in most cases, based on a facts
and circumstances test, at 50% of the highest aggregate balance of all unreported for-
eign financial accounts during the years under examination, and it will never exceed
100% of such balance.252 Moreover, the reasonable cause exception for non-willful
violations does not apply.253 In addition to the above penalties, the IRS may also im-
pose a penalty for negligence.254 Under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(6)(A), the IRS may
“impose a civil money penalty of not more than $500 on any financial institution or
nonfinancial trade or business which negligently violates any provision of this sub-
chapter or any regulation prescribed under this subchapter.” Moreover, criminal pen-
alties may be imposed under 31 U.S.C. § 5322. Refer to the following chart, which
highlights the civil and criminal penalties that may be asserted for willfully or negli-
gently not complying with the FBAR reporting and record-keeping requirements255:
248 Moore v. United States, 115 No. C13-2063-RAJ, 2015 WL 1510007, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. 2015).
249 See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C).
250 Id.
251 Id. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(i); see also 31 C.F.R. § 1010.820 (“In the case of a violation of §
1010.350 or § 1010.420 involving a failure to report the existence of an account or any
identifying information required to be provided with respect to such account, a civil penalty
not to exceed the greater of the amount (not to exceed $100,000) equal to the balance in the
account at the time of the violation, or $25,000.”).
252 IRS Memorandum, supra note 244.
253 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C)(ii).
254 IRS GUIDE, supra note 26.
255 The original version of this chart appears in the “Penalties” section of the IRS GUIDE,
supra note 26, but it has been amended to reflect changes made by the IRS. See IRS Memo-
randum, supra note 244. Such changes are noted by an asterisk (*).
586 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:553





















In addition to the penalty under 31
U.S.C. § 5321(a)(6)(A), with respect













Up to the greater of $100,000, or 50
percent (50%) of the amount in the
account at the time of the violation.
*From May 13, 2015–May 13,
2016, most cases will be limited to
50 percent (50%) of the highest ag-
gregate balance of all unreported
foreign financial accounts during the
years under examination. In no
event will the penalty exceed 100
percent (100%) of the highest aggre-



















Up to the greater of $100,000, or 50
percent (50%) of the amount in the






§ 5322(b) for crimi-
nal. This penalty






Up to the greater of $100,000, or 50
percent (50%) of the amount in the





§ 1001. This penalty
applies to all U.S.
persons.
Civil and Criminal Penalties may be imposed together. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(d).
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III. APPLYING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE FOREIGN ACCOUNT
TAX COMPLIANCE ACT AND THE REPORT OF FOREIGN BANK AND
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS: DO FATCA AND FBAR PENALTIES
TRIGGER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT?
At first glance, both FBAR and FATCA seem like normal, constitutional statutory
provisions to combat tax evasion; however, it is important to look beyond the textual
interpretation of the Code and focus on the functionality of the provisions. FATCA
imposes hefty fines on U.S. persons who are non-compliant with its regulations. As
discussed in Part II.A, FATCA imposes the same fines on U.S. persons who non-
willfully violate its disclosure requirements as those who are willful violators. This
means that the statutory penalties are objective, and apply to all U.S. persons who
are non-compliant. Moreover, as discussed in Part II.B, it is clear that FBAR penal-
ties are prone to being excessive and the IRS has left room for assessing such fines,
despite explaining that “in most cases,” it will cap willful penalties at 50%. The
IRS’s Interim Guidance for Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)
Penalties provides that the new procedures to cap the willful failure to report
offshore accounts were “developed to ensure consistency and effectiveness in the
administration of FBAR penalties,” and that “[t]hey will help ensure FBAR penalty
determinations are adequately supported and penalties are asserted in a fair and
consistent manner.”256 This suggests that FBAR penalties may be inconsistent and
possibly excessive; in other words, unfair.257 Although practitioners have alluded to
the rationale that the previous penalties were excessive, the IRS never admitted within
the guidance that it changed the procedures due to Eighth Amendment concerns.
The Kiplinger Tax document that states that the “IRS is capping the penalties for
willful nonreporting of offshore accounts, after some tax pros claimed the fines over
multiple years can be excessive and violate the Eighth Amendment,” is somewhat
misleading.258 Yes, the new procedures did come after the tax professionals made
256 IRS Memorandum, supra note 244.
257 See Andrew Velarde, FBAR Penalty Cap Reflects Sensitivity to 8th Amendment
Concerns, TAX ANALYSTS, June 2, 2015 (explaining that “[i]n a memorandum for all IRS
Large Business and International Division, Small Business/Self-Employed Division, and
Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division employees issued on May 13, the commis-
sioners from all three divisions provided instruction on the issuance of penalties for both
willful and non-willful FBAR violations.”). Velarde stated that “[p]ractitioners welcomed
recent guidance from the IRS on taxpayer penalties for failure to file foreign bank account
reports, noting that it could reflect a concern that penalty amounts that had previously been
possible might run afoul of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added). Within the article,
Velarde quotes Scott D. Michel of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered as saying: “It appears to
relect some sensitivities concerning the Eighth Amendment argument against excessive fines
and penalties and may make it more likely that non-[offshore voluntary disclosure program]
penalty cases will settle prior to the court action necessary for the government to collect the
Title 31 penalty.” Id.
258 Kiplinger Tax Document (2015) (on file with author).
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these claims, but there is no reason to believe that those tax professionals caused the
IRS to change its procedures—it is merely correlation, rather than causation. The
IRS did not say that the new procedures were due to claims that the penalty regime
was excessive, rather that the IRS needed to provide more consistent, effective, and
fair penalty determinations.259
Under the Eighth Amendment, the United States cannot impose an excessive
fine on a U.S. person.260 The test that has consistently been applied since United
States v. Bajakajian, provides that a fine must be proportional to the gravity of the
crime committed. Given the incredibly high indiscriminate penalties that FATCA
and FBAR impose on both willful and non-willful violators, it is important to deter-
mine whether the penalties are excessive under the Eighth Amendment. This Section
determines that FATCA imposes harsh penalties that are excessive with regard to
both willful and non-willful violators of the provision. The strongest argument is
that the loss of revenue for many of the assets of U.S. persons who have evaded
paying taxes on assets held within foreign financial institutions is substantial. For
instance, in Bajakajian,
[t]he harm that respondent caused was [ ] minimal. Failure to re-
port his currency affected only one party, the Government . . . .
There was no fraud on the United States, and respondent caused
no loss to the public fisc. Had his crime gone undetected, the
Government would have been deprived only of the information
that $357,144 had left the country.261
Another troubling issue about the argument made by the Bajakajian Court was that
the Court distinguished forfeitures as distinct from punishments that served as reme-
dial for reimbursing the Government for loses accruing from the evasion of customs
duties.262 Framing the tax penalties as punitive, rather than as a monetary penalty
equal to the value of lost revenue, i.e., a remedial sanction, is the most appropriate
way to classify the penalties that FATCA imposes as discussed in Parts I and II. When
framed like a penalty, FATCA is more analogous to Bajakajian than the customs
cases, because a penalty that results in the full value, or more, of a defendant’s
currency would be incredibly similar to forfeiture and would violate the Excessive
Fines Clause. It goes without saying that the penalties assessed for non-compliance
are more than remedial.
259 See IRS Memorandum, supra note 244.
260 U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
261 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 339 (1997).
262 Id. at 342 (“It is, then, hardly accurate to say that the only loss the government can
sustain from concealing the goods liable to seizure is their single value . . . . Double the value
may not be more than complete indemnity.” (quoting Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S.
531, 547 (1871))).
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Under the FATCA regime, a U.S. taxpayer’s failure to file Form 8938 could
result in a penalty of up to $60,000 for an asset valued at less than that amount.263
It is important to note that the tax value for the asset is much lower than the asset’s
value, and there is no possible way that the penalty would not be perceived as
punitive. For instance, a taxpayer who has at least $50,000 held in a foreign finan-
cial institution is required to file a Form 8938.264 There is up to a $10,000 fine for
failure to disclose the value.265 Additionally, there is an additional $10,000 fine for
each thirty-day period of non-filing after the Internal Revenue Service notifies the
U.S. person of the failure to disclose for a potential maximum penalty of $60,000.266
These are civil penalties, and criminal penalties may apply.267
Accordingly, this means that the taxpayer could pay $10,000 more than the value
of the foreign financial account. The income tax would have been no greater than
40% (assuming that the top bracket is at a high of 39.6%) for one year of inclusion
within taxable income, which would be $20,000 using 40% for simplicity right now.
However, the penalty of $60,000 is equivalent to a tax rate of 120%. This is clearly
punitive, rather than a remedial action. Moreover, the fines for one year of complete
non-compliance completely sap the investor or U.S. person of the entire asset.
Although FATCA does not replace a taxpayer’s obligation to file the FBAR, it
does increase a taxpayer’s obligations to file additional forms disclosing the same
information.268 The issue is that, in doing so, FATCA makes it more difficult for a
taxpayer to properly file all of the forms required. Also, requiring multiple forms to
disclose the same thing makes compliance more difficult, and more than likely
increases the errors surrounding compliance.
U.S. persons must report their worldwide income on their taxes.
Plus, they must file an FBAR annually if their offshore accounts
total over $10,000 at any time. If you have both failures, the IRS
wants you to go into the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program,
also known as the OVDP. It involves reopening 8 tax years, and
paying taxes, interest and penalties, but no prosecution. But the
penalties can be painful, especially the one equal to 27.5% of the
highest balance in the offshore accounts. As a result, some people
want to amend their taxes and file FBARs outside the OVDP.
Some people are willing to pay the taxes they owe, but not the
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27.5% penalty. The IRS calls this a “quiet disclosure” and says it
will come after you if you try it. That might include prosecution
or large civil FBAR penalties.269
Additionally, the fines for not disclosing certain foreign trusts is even greater
than failure to properly disclose foreign financial assets. The initial penalty for
failing to report is the greater of $10,000, and either 5% of the value of the portion
of a grantor trust, 35% of the value of the property transferred to a foreign trust, or
35% of the amount distributed to a distributee who fails to report distributions.270
Moreover, FBAR requires U.S. persons to report similar information, which means
that a taxpayer may incur multiple penalties for the same failure to disclose informa-
tion, both on the Form 8938 and FinCEN 114. Without aggregating the two, FBAR
penalties may also be excessively egregious. Section 5321 of Title 31 of the United
States Code provides that the greater of a maximum penalty of $100,000 or 50% of
the balance of the account at the time of violation applies for willful failures to file
an FBAR. Although willfulness deserves greater punishment than a non-willful act,
the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The only harm
to the U.S. government is the lost tax revenue and interest that it could have earned
for the past years. The willful actor, once caught, must pay the taxes owed, plus
interest for those years of non-compliance. This is punishment enough, particularly
when the actor may face criminal punishment as well. In no case should someone
pay a penalty that exceeds the value of that person’s account.
CONCLUSION
In order to ensure that FATCA continues to serve as an important tax equalizer
and funding mechanism for the HIRE Act, it is vital that Congress incorporate policy
changes that would prevent disproportionate penalties and bring FATCA within the
constitutional umbrella. The changes necessary are simple.
First, with regard to the penalties for not filing the appropriate form, add a clause
that states “unless the maximum fine of $60,000 exceeds the value of the asset, then
the fine shall be reduced to the value of the asset.” This may still be excessive, but less
excessive. The best practice would be going further than this and possibly changing
the fine to capture the amount of tax that would have been owed on the asset for the
year disclosure was not provided. This does not create the same problem that the
FBAR form has (i.e., the 50% penalty for each year of non-compliance) because the
FATCA disclosure requirements did not go into effect until July 2014. However,
there may be an implementation issue for FATCA overall with regard to the strategic
enacting. FATCA essentially scares tax evaders into compliance, and it is fair to say
269 Wood, supra note 137.
270 MICHAELS, supra note 8, ¶ 6.15[3][c].
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that many taxpayers will not comply with the reporting requirements unless there
are, for lack of a better word, excessive penalties. This creates a tension between the
policy and the U.S. Constitution. Which is more important? Probably not the policy,
which means that the U.S. government should be limited to either the actual amount
of revenue it could have collected on an asset for each year of non-compliance or
for the tax owed in the first year of non-compliance, and then the interest that the
government would have been able to accrue based on inflation throughout the years
since non-compliance? This could still produce a substantial fine, but would be
proportional to the gravity of the non-willful violator, and then the government could
impose an additional standard fine on those who are willful violators.
For now, the above examples serve as suggested alternatives, which are outside
the scope of this Note. And even though FBAR penalties may be more unconstitu-
tional than the FATCA penalties, FATCA is a requirement that is in addition to
FBAR and imposes fines in addition to the FBAR fines if the person forgets to file
two separate forms.271 It is important to remember that FATCA’s goal is admirable,
and that the policy objectives are sound. Offshore tax evasion continues to be a
pressing issue. As cited by Peter Nelson, “[i]n her remarks to the New York State
Bar Association, Assistant Secretary McMahon said: ‘Ultimately, we believe that
our efforts to implement FATCA and to resolve the challenges it poses can and
should advance the important work already begun . . . .’”272 While this Note high-
lights some detrimental flaws of FATCA, it is important to do so. Without acknowl-
edging the flaws, FATCA’s ability to combat offshore tax evasion could subside. It
is better to recognize the shortcomings early on so that they may be resolved, and
FATCA can continue to “detect, deter, and discourage.”
Although FATCA’s purpose is admirable, it does not comport with the require-
ments of the U.S. Constitution, nor does the FBAR. The Eighth Amendment requires
that the Government not impose an “excessive fine,” yet FATCA requires U.S. per-
sons to pay excessive civil penalties if they are non-compliant.273 As Andrew Quinlan
said, “FATCA remains both politically and legally vulnerable.”274 Even though this
Note only analyzes FATCA with regard to the Eighth Amendment, it is still vulnera-
ble under both the Fourth Amendment and Senate’s treaty power.275 Although the
Treasury has pledged to gradually enforce the requirements,276 it does not change the
fact that the penalties are excessive. Given the recent crackdown on offshore tax
evasion, U.S. officials continue to increase their reach.277
271 Kaye, supra note 1, at 363–64.
272 Nelson, supra note 107, at 423.
273 Kaye, supra note 1, at 363.
274 Quinlan, supra note 18.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Laura Saunders, When Are Tax Penalties Excessive? Does a $3.5 Million Fine on a
Secret $1.7 Million Swiss Account Violate the Eighth Amendment’s Prohibition of Excessive
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After the recent outcome of United States v. Zwerner, there must be a limit to
the madness surrounding excessive penalties.278 In this civil lawsuit the government
wanted to collect nearly $3.5 million in penalties from a taxpayer who had a secret
Swiss account although the account balance was never higher than $1.7 million.279
Although these penalties were strictly for FBAR, the government may be becoming
too powerful. “Since 2009, the Justice Department has filed more than 75 criminal
cases against U.S. taxpayers involving the alleged failure to declare offshore finan-
cial accounts,” and the prosecutors have singled out the large penalty of fifty percent
of the offshore financial account’s maximum balance.280 With regard to United
States v. Beras,281 the court ruled that “the forfeiture of $ 135,794 for the crime of
failing to report currency would violate the Excessive Fines Clause”; it does not appear
to make sense that penalties greater than the value of an asset would fall within the
Excessive Fines Clause.282 The purpose of a penalty is to punish, not deplete a tax-
payer. From a business perspective, if the taxpayer is fined an amount that is greater
than the value of the asset, the taxpayer may become insolvent, or incapable of pay-
ing the owed back taxes. Then the penalty becomes a remedial payment, rather than
serving as a method of discouragement for U.S. taxpayers. From the constitutional
perspective, though, depletion becomes synonymous to overtly excessive. Regardless
of the confusion about the “grossly disproportionate” test, any reasonable person
would find the depletion unconscionable.
Moreover, with the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, lower
courts have struggled with determining which penalties are within the scope of the
Excessive Fines Clause;283 thus, if anything this Note is a call for more guidance.284
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act is a purposeful act that deserves respect,
because it has provided the IRS with an appropriate tool to combat tax evasion. While
it may not be the most popular tool amongst those who have hidden many assets in
foreign financial accounts, it does provide more fairness within the tax system,
Fines?, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732
4694904578598230978458720 [http://perma.cc/2X5Y-DX95].
278 Id.; Wood, supra note 137.
279 Saunders, supra note 277.
280 Id.
281 183 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 1999).
282 Eric C. Surette, When Does Forfeiture of Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent
Violate Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment, 164 A.L.R. Fed. 591 (2000).
283 See, e.g., McLean, supra note 87, at 834–35 (“In the years since Bajakajian, lower
courts have (in the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court) grappled with a
variety of issues associated with Excessive Fines Clause doctrine. . . . These courts have
generally not regarded a defendant’s inability to pay a fine as a relevant consideration in the
context of the Eighth Amendment.”).
284 See, e.g., King, supra note 42, at 151–52. Although King’s analysis pre-dated Bajakajian,
it still remains relevant given that the Court did not provide true guidance in terms of deter-
mining whether a penalty is excessive.
2015] THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT & TAX EVASION 593
thereby limiting the escape routes available to the wealthy. It is important to remem-
ber, however, that this should not be perceived as a war on the wealthy, rather a war
on the illegal accessions to wealth that unduly burden those who play by the rules.
The only problem is that the penalties for failure to report foreign financial assets
may be excessive in some situations.285 While this does not provide enough justifica-
tion to render the entire policy unconstitutional, it may be enough to render it par-
tially unconstitutional. If the Supreme Court had provided more guidance regarding
disproportionate penalties,286 this situation would more than likely not have occurred.
Congress and the IRS would have been able to determine more appropriate penalties
by accurately determining that FBAR and Form 8938 penalties when grouped to-
gether can be excessive; thus providing a bright-line or ceiling on such penalties that
took into consideration the proportionality of a penalty relative to the value of the
unreported assets.287
285 Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes,
44 CONN. L. REV. 675, 679–80 (2012).
286 See King, supra note 42, at 146 (“The Court would do better to confront the risk of
disproportionate penalties directly, under the Eighth Amendment, than to employ the clumsy
proxy of mandatory joinder under the Double Jeopardy Clause.”).
287 See id. at 149 n.140 (“Yet because of the variety of congressional controls over agency
action, Congress is more likely to become aware of the overlap between criminal and ad-
ministrative penalties than to understand the overlap between certain nonadministrative
penalties. Professor Lear has argued, however, that one particular agency cannot be trusted to
speak the will of Congress. She maintains that the statements of the United States Sentencing
Commission cannot provide the necessary congressional intent to override the Blockburger
presumption.”).
